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From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the 
Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible 
Remedies* 
“The sole exception to th[e] rule [that a court must take the allegations 
as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be] lies with allegations 
that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about 




Providing citizens access to the judicial system is a core principle of 
democracy.2  In a civil action, access to the courts begins with the 
plaintiff’s filing of a complaint.3  To this end, for nearly fifty years our 
nation’s courts embraced a simplified concept of pleading that rests on 
providing the adverse party “notice” of the allegations against them.  
However, the United States Supreme Court raised the pleading standard 
from “notice” to something more than “notice” in recent years. 
In a 2007 class action antitrust case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,4 
the Supreme Court addressed pleading requirements in federal court and 
overruled the well established standard enunciated in a 1957 case, 
Conley v. Gibson—that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
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 1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 2. A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009); 
see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “[f]ew issues 
in civil procedure jurisprudence are more significant than pleading standards, which are the key that 
opens access to courts”). 
 3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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prove no set of facts . . . which would entitle him to relief.” 5  Conley was 
the seminal case clarifying “notice pleading,” a concept long understood 
to be the intent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal 
Rules”), adopted twenty years earlier in 1938.6  Abandoning Conley, the 
Court in Twombly applied a confusing “plausibility standard” of 
pleading,7 dismissing the class of plaintiffs’ allegations of Sherman Act 
violations by four telecommunication companies.8 
Less than one month after Twombly, the Supreme Court in Erickson 
v. Pardus applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) in traditional 
fashion, citing the “fair notice” standard enunciated in Conley.9  
Although Erickson involved a pro se prisoner alleging civil rights 
violations,10 a vastly different situation than Twombly, the opinion’s 
significance was its citation of Conley and its “no set of facts” standard 
after Twombly.  However, any speculation about the significance of the 
Court’s reliance on Conley was unwarranted because courts have 
historically scrutinized pro se prisoners under a lower standard.11  Thus, 
the applicability of the Twombly standard remained speculative and 
confusing for the judiciary, practitioners, and scholars.12  There was 
much uncertainty about whether the Twombly standard would be limited 
to the antitrust context and how judges would define plausibility, or more 
generally, interpret and react to this decision.  Such uncertainty was 
alleviated by the extension of the plausibility standard to a civil rights 
claim, and indeed all civil claims, in the Supreme Court’s controversial 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal13 decision last term.  However, alleviating confusion 
should not be confused with better serving the interests of justice. 
                                                     
 5. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 431, 434 n.24 (2008) (reinforcing the articulated purpose of providing notice in pleadings). 
 7. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. 
 8. Id. at 566–70. 
 9. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). 
 10. Id. at 89–94. 
 11. Spencer, supra note 6, at 456. 
 12. See, e.g., Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 102 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007) (noting that “plausibility” is antitrust jargon 
and applying it outside of that context is a misreading of Twombly); Spencer, supra note 2, at 1 
(noting that Bell Atlantic “has not left courts and litigants with a clear or precise understanding of 
what it takes to state a claim that can survive a motion to dismiss”); Scott Dodson, Essay, Pleading 
Standards After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN  BRIEF 135, 138 (2007), available at 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (asking “[w]hat does Bell Atlantic 
really mean?”). 
 13. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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The broadened application of Twombly has received mixed reviews 
in the legal community.  Some view the decision as an unwarranted 
extension of the plausibility doctrine in the face of other fairly recent 
Supreme Court decisions that upheld a “notice” pleading standard in civil 
rights actions.14  To others, the decision represents a justified and long 
overdue expansion of “heightened” pleading that will not render 
defendants helpless when faced with discovery costs imposed by futile 
complaints, particularly in the realm of complex litigation.  Most agree, 
however, that it represents a substantial shift away from the traditional 
liberal “notice” pleading standard.  Justice Souter, author of Twombly, 
reveals the juxtaposition of the two cases in the quote from his Iqbal 
dissent cited at the beginning of this Comment. 
Some view Iqbal as the most consequential decision of the 2008–
2009 term and possibly the most important in a decade for “day-to-day” 
litigation.15  The controversial ruling has even instigated legislative 
responses with the introduction of the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 
200916 and the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009.17  Both pieces of 
legislation seek to undo the Twombly-Iqbal standard and reinstate the 
Conley standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions.18  Rule 12(b)(6) is the 
impetus for judicial rulings on the sufficiency of a complaint as it allows 
a party to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.”19 
In the wake of Iqbal, the current pleading standard is likely a product 
of the increasing complexity of society, industry, and the justice system 
in general.  Within the federal judicial system, the frequency and 
intensity of complex litigation has vastly multiplied with large-scale 
toxic torts, products liability, conspiracy claims, and civil rights suits.  
The discovery and case management issues that accompany such 
                                                     
 14. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“[I]mposing . . . [a] 
heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must include only ‘a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”); Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (“We think that it is 
impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with 
the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules.”). 
 15. Adam Liptak, 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21bar.html. 
 16. The Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (introduced 
by Senator Arlen Specter on July 22, 2009 and co-sponsored by Senator Russ Feingold, the bill has 
been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 17. The Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (introduced by 
Representative Jerrold Nadler and co-sponsored by eighteen other members of Congress). 
 18. See id.; S. 1504. 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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litigation were part of the thrust behind the Twombly decision and its 
extension in Iqbal. 
This Comment will examine the confusion and controversy 
surrounding current pleading standards in federal court, demonstrate the 
need for change, and propose that, ultimately, the best way to resolve the 
issue is by amending the Federal Rules to enable complainants bringing 
particular causes of action to have access to “phased discovery” that 
allows for equitable screening of cases for lack of merit.  Legislation 
setting forth claim-specific standards is a compelling alternative should 
amending the Federal Rules prove unlikely.  This Comment will examine 
the implications of Iqbal and consider various judicial and legislative 
alternatives that could remedy the case’s negative consequences.  The 
practical effect of the “plausibility” pleading standard after Iqbal is to 
depart with traditional notice pleading and require factual allegations that 
are more than just consistent with impropriety.  This requires a plaintiff 
to have a more stringent factual background than is typical under 
“notice” pleading.  One way or another, modern pleading needs reform 
on some level. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the background of notice 
pleading through a brief discussion of the history and adoption of the 
“modern” pleading standard in Rule 8.  An account of the general 
scrutiny that notice pleading has undergone in various legal areas will be 
described to provide context for the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.  A 
review of the facts, reasoning, and holdings of Twombly and Iqbal will 
follow. 
Part III will explain how the Iqbal standard’s lack of precision 
creates problems for the judicial system and will reveal the need for 
clarification.  It will also note actual and potential implications of Iqbal’s 
extension of the plausibility standard to all civil actions in federal court.  
An analysis of the decision’s impact on removal, state law, affirmative 
defense pleading, and litigants’ choice of forum will follow.  Having 
established the need for a remedy, possible courses of action by both the 
judicial and legislative bodies will then be examined and their 
advantages and disadvantages assessed.  The judicial and legislative 
alternatives are those aiming to accomplish one or more of five things: 
(1) judicially clarify plausibility; (2) judicially utilize current Federal 
Rules that enable fair case management and screening of claims; (3) 
legislatively specify pleading standards for specific claims; (4) amend 
the Federal Rules to include claim-specific standards; or (5) amend the 
Federal Rules to include a uniform standard that somehow 
accommodates the discovery and case management complexities of 
modern civil litigation.  This Comment will conclude by recommending 
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that, absent a clarification of the current standard that would cease 
denying individuals with meritorious claims access to courts, amending 
the Federal Rules to grant judges increased pretrial ability to manage 
potentially meritorious cases is a viable remedy for the pleading 
problem.  Alternatively, legislation that creates claim-specific standards 
would alleviate the cost and efficiency concerns present in Twombly and 
Iqbal, while making courts and rulemakers rethink the application of the 
heightened standard. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Origin of Notice Pleading 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is the foundation of the federal 
pleading system.  Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, 
pleading was a technical endeavor that “served four functions: (1) 
providing notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) identifying 
baseless claims; (3) setting each party’s view of the facts; and (4) 
narrowing the issues.”20  Modern pleading is only expected to execute 
the first function.21  Thus, the reform executed by the adoption of the 
Federal Rules represented an effort to diverge from judgments on the 
pleadings and merely require plaintiffs to provide “notice.”  The drafters 
desired a judicial system that would not place undue emphasis on the 
form and substance of the pleading or value technicality over the merits 
of the claim.22  Rule 8(a)(2) reflects this end by requiring that a 
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.”23  Charles Clark, principal architect of 
the original Federal Rules, was instrumental in abolishing the need for 
hyper-technical scrutiny of pleadings, believing a claim’s merits should 
be fleshed out in discovery, summary judgment, or trial.24 
Until the Supreme Court first addressed the Rule 8(a)(2) standard in 
Conley, there had been some resistance by courts to the simplified 
                                                     
 20. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 513 (9th ed. 
2008 rev.). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 990–91 
(2003). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 24. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 873, 891–92 (2009) (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439–40 (1986)). 
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system of pleading the Federal Rules promulgated.25  As already 
mentioned, Conley’s “no set of facts” language reigned as the prevailing 
standard for over fifty years until Twombly recently overruled it.  Conley 
concerned a class action by African-American railway employees who 
were union members and had been demoted or fired by the railway, 
which stated that the positions had been abolished.26  In actuality, the 
jobs were not eliminated, but filled by whites or refilled by blacks in a 
demoted capacity as the petitioners were laid off.27  The black employees 
alleged that the union failed to represent them equally and in good faith, 
in violation of the Railway Labor Act.28  The union moved to dismiss on 
three grounds, one being for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.29  In adjudicating that motion, the Court applied the “no set 
of facts” standard to rule petitioners’ allegations of concerted action by 
the railway and union to protect their jobs to a lesser extent than the 
whites was satisfactory.30  The Court also held that a claimant is not 
required to “set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim” 
under the Federal Rules.31  The Court noted that if petitioners’ 
allegations were proven, it would constitute a patent breach of the 
union’s statutory obligation to represent employees fairly and without 
discrimination.32 
Although Conley remained good law until Twombly’s perceived 
rejection and Iqbal’s reinforcement of a stricter standard, its pronounced 
standard was scrutinized by lower courts over the years.  This scrutiny 
occurred predominately in the areas of antitrust; litigation over the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA); civil rights; conspiracy; copyright; defamation; 
negligence; and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO).33  “Heightened pleading” is not a new concept.  Federal Rule of 
Procedure 9(b) already imposes a heightened standard for alleging 
certain claims, stating, “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state 
                                                     
 25. Spencer, supra note 6, at 435. 
 26. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 43 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 45–46. 
 31. Id. at 47. 
 32. Id. at 46. 
 33. See Fairman, supra note 22, at 1011–59 (analyzing a perceived wide range of factual detail 
required in federal complaints for the listed causes of action). 
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with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”34  In 
the Rule 8 realm, such a notion has long been perceived as applicable to 
particular areas of the law—namely, securities fraud and civil rights 
litigation.35  One of the most ardent attempts by lower courts to impose 
stricter standards concerned civil rights litigation during the Civil Rights 
Era.36  In a 1968 case, Valley v. Maule, a court plainly rejected Conley’s 
standard as applied to civil rights cases, noting an increasing number of 
such claims and their imposition of “considerable expense, vexation and 
perhaps unfounded notoriety.”37  Numerous circuit and district courts 
endorsed a heightened pleading requirement for civil rights actions after 
Valley and into the early nineties.38 
These attempts caused the Supreme Court to address and strike down 
the imposition of heightened pleading in 1993, overruling lower courts’ 
attempts to impose such a standard and reiterating Conley.  That case 
was Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, where the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding 
that the application of a heightened pleading standard in a civil rights 
action involving municipal liability does not exist.39  Nonetheless, some 
lower courts persisted in their application of a heightened standard, 
causing the Court to re-examine the issue almost a decade later in the 
employment discrimination arena.  In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the 
Court reversed the Second Circuit’s dismissal of an employee’s suit 
against a former employer that was based on the failure of the 
employee’s complaint to adequately allege a prima facie case.40  Citing 
the language of Rule 8(a)(2) and Conley, the Court held that such a 
complaint need not establish a prima facie case.41  Importantly, the 
Swierkiewicz Court rejected respondent’s argument that allowing 
lawsuits based on conclusory allegations would burden courts and 
encourage meritless claims, stating that “a requirement of greater 
specificity for particular claims is a result that ‘must be obtained by the 
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial 
                                                     
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 35. See Fairman, supra note 22, at 988; Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (1998); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights 
Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HOW. L.J. 99, 113 (2008). 
 36. See Spencer, supra note 35, at 106–08. 
 37. Id. at 112 (quoting Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960–61 (D. Conn. 1968)). 
 38. Id. at 112–13. 
 39. 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
 40. 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). 
 41. Id. at 514–15. 
0.6.0_MIZE FINAL 5/31/2010  2:18:09 PM 
1252 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
interpretation.’”42  These consistent affirmations of the Conley standard 
and refusal to judicially interpret Rule 8(a) as requiring a heightened 
standard left litigants with a strong sense of where pleading stood in 
federal court. 
B. Twombly and Iqbal: Defining the New Heightened Standard 
The Supreme Court applied the “no set of facts” standard 
consistently until the Twombly decision in 2007.  In Twombly, consumers 
brought a putative class action lawsuit against Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers (ILECs) alleging an antitrust conspiracy, in violation 
of the Sherman Act, to prevent competitive entry into local telephone and 
Internet service markets and to avoid competing with one another in their 
respective markets.43  The class alleged that the ILECs were engaged in 
illegal, anti-competitive parallel conduct.44  The Court held that in a 
Section 1 Sherman Act allegation, the “claim requires a complaint with 
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest an agreement was 
made.”45  No such factual matter was pled, the Court held, because a 
mere statement of parallel conduct, even if consciously taken, “needs 
some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a [section] 
1 claim.”46  Most importantly, the Court announced a standard that only 
required “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”47  The Court did away with the “no set of facts” language from 
Conley, stating that the “phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, 
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been 
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts 
consistent with the allegations of the complaint.”48 
Important language was used to describe what allegations will not 
stand—“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”49  
The Court indicated the lower limits of the standard by stating that a 
complaint may proceed even if it strikes the “judge that actual proof of 
                                                     
 42. Id. (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168) (emphasis added). 
 43. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550–51 (2007). 
 44. Id. at 550. 
 45. Id. at 556. 
 46. Id. at 557. 
 47. Id. at 570. 
 48. Id. at 563. 
 49. Id. at 555. 
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those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and 
unlikely.’”50  The oft-cited language that subsequent cases gleaned from 
Twombly was that plaintiffs must plead enough facts to state a claim for 
relief that “nudge[s] their claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.”51 
Notable in Justice Stevens’s dissent was his criticism that the Court 
underestimated a trial court’s case management capabilities.52  He cited 
Federal Rule 26 as granting courts broad discretion in controlling 
discovery, including the “sequence in which such discovery devices may 
be deployed; and the limitations imposed on them.”53  He argued such 
discretion could be employed in considering the plaintiffs’ proposed 
“phased discovery” for issues of the alleged conspiracy and class 
certification.54 
The Twombly decision generated much discussion about the 
parameters of its application.  Iqbal greatly reduced this speculation.  In 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, plaintiff Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani, was arrested 
on criminal charges and detained by federal officials on suspected links 
to terrorist activity after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.55  
Iqbal’s complaint alleged numerous causes of action, several of which 
revolved around his treatment while in a special maximum security 
prison in Brooklyn, New York.56  However, the allegations pertinent in 
Iqbal’s Supreme Court case were that former Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Robert 
Mueller violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights under the 
Constitution by designating him as a person of high interest because of 
his race, religion, or national origin.57  Iqbal also alleged that both 
Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject” him to the confinement conditions he endured.58  Iqbal 
alleged Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the policy that 
designated him a high interest individual and that Mueller was 
“instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation.”59 
                                                     
 50. Id. at 556 (quoting Schener v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 
 51. Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (applying this language 
from Twombly). 
 52. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 594 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 56. Id. at 1943–44. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1944. 
 59. Id. 
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Iqbal applied the new “heightened” standard in Twombly by painting 
with a broad brush.  Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Kennedy 
discounted the distinction between the Court’s interpretation of Rule 8 in 
Twombly’s antitrust context and the civil rights situation in Iqbal—
noting the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules.60  He asserted 
that Rule 8 “governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts.’  Our decision in 
Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it 
applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”61  The Court then 
elucidated a two-pronged approach to test the sufficiency of a Rule 
12(b)(6) challenge to a complaint.62 
The first step is to distinguish between legal conclusions and factual 
allegations to identify pleadings that “are not entitled to the assumption 
of truth.”63  Second, the court should determine whether the factual 
allegations are well-pleaded so as to support the legal conclusions; if 
such allegations are found, the court is to “assume their veracity and 
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”64  
The Court applied this two-prong test to hold that Iqbal’s complaint 
failed to include facts that plausibly showed Ashcroft and Mueller 
intentionally adopted a policy of classifying detainees like Iqbal as “high 
interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin.65 
Notably, Justice Souter, author of the Court’s opinion in Twombly, 
wrote the dissent in Iqbal, arguing that the majority misapplied the 
pleading standard set forth in Twombly.66  Justice Souter’s critique was a 
technical one, claiming that the majority incorrectly examined the 
complaint’s contested allegations in isolation.67  He accused the majority 
of selecting certain conclusory statements and squaring them with its 
treatment of other allegations as nonconclusory.68 
Like Twombly, Iqbal also discussed discovery and case management 
issues.  Many were addressed in the Second Circuit’s opinion, which 
held that, in a qualified immunity case, the district court may “consider 
exercising its discretion to permit some limited and tightly controlled 
reciprocal discovery so that a defendant may probe for amplification of a 
                                                     
 60. Id. at 1953. 
 61. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (citations omitted). 
 62. Id. at 1950. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1952. 
 66. Id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 1960. 
 68. Id. at 1961. 
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plaintiff’s claims and a plaintiff may probe such matters as a defendant’s 
knowledge of relevant facts and personal involvement in challenged 
conduct.”69  Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that 
a district court might wish to structure such limited discovery by 
examining written responses to interrogatories and requests to admit 
before authorizing depositions, and by deferring discovery directed to 
high-level officials until discovery of front-line officials has been 
completed and has demonstrated the need for discovery higher up the 
ranks.70 
However, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Iqbal reversed, 
noting that the trial judge’s option to exercise careful case management 
that allows for carefully targeted discovery is unwarranted.71  The 
Court’s reasoning was based on Twombly’s holding that on motions to 
dismiss, the question “does not turn on the controls placed upon the 
discovery process.”72  The Court gave special deference to the fact that 
the Iqbal defendants, petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller, are entitled to 
qualified immunity, because the purpose of that defense is to “free 
officials from the concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of 
disruptive discovery.’”73  Justice Breyer’s dissent in Iqbal focused almost 
exclusively on the issue of discovery.74  He agreed with the Second 
Circuit and stated that in a qualified immunity case, “a district court, for 
example, can begin discovery with lower level government defendants 
before determining whether a case can be made to allow discovery 
related to higher government officials.”75 
Twombly and Iqbal differed on the causes of action adjudicated and 
the type of plaintiff.  One may also note the differing political undertones 
of the cases.  Iqbal dealt with a 9/11-era policy advanced by the Bush 
Administration, a more politicized issue than Twombly’s class action 
antitrust scenario.  This skepticism aside, the shifting dichotomy of the 
Court, from Twombly’s seven-to-two decision to Iqbal’s five-to-four 
decision, likely reflects some of the Justices’ unwillingness to extend 
what had been perceived as a heightened standard to all civil actions.  In 
some sense, Twombly’s antitrust context provided the necessary scenario 
                                                     
 69. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991)). 
 74. Id. at 1961–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. 
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for the Court to articulate a more modern pleading standard that lower 
courts had been striving toward in the decades prior.76  Yet, the 
standard’s extension to all civil actions was likely not envisioned by 
some members of the Court at the time of Twombly. 
C. Responses to the New Standard 
Both the Twombly and Iqbal opinions have been heavily cited.77  
This suggests two things: (1) litigants, chiefly defendants, have noted the 
new weapon provided to them; and (2) courts have, in part, endorsed this 
weapon’s usage, possibly because of the desire to exercise judicial 
efficiency and docket control.  The result of both cases has been to grant 
more discretion to the judiciary and leave litigants with an indistinct 
impression of where pleading stands today.  The Notice Pleading 
Restoration Act of 200978 and Access to Open Courts Act of 200979 are 
legislative efforts substantiating a general concern that the new standard 
will deprive individuals of a fair attempt at justice.  In a House Judiciary 
Committee Meeting on October 27, 2009 entitled “Access to Justice 
Denied—Ashcroft v. Iqbal,” several witnesses asserted that the pleading 
standard was too high.80  One, in particular, went so far as to say, “A 
person is now barred from entering the courthouse absent being able to 
drum up facts that convince a federal judge—someone who breathes 
fairly rarified air—that her claim is subjectively plausible.”81  Such a 
claim is in tune with much of the criticism of modern pleading after 
Iqbal. 
                                                     
 76. See Bone, supra note 24, at 884 (noting that Twombly was appropriate for dismissal on the 
pleadings because of its features associated with nonmeritorious filings and high discovery costs, 
and the fact that the allegations really did not indicate that the claim had merits). 
 77. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Mr. Iqbal Goes to Washington, AMLAW LITIG. DAILY, Oct. 28, 
2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202435006595&Mr_Iqbal_Goes 
_to_Washington (noting that as of October 28, 2009, Iqbal had already been cited more than 3,000 
times in lower court rulings); Bone, supra note 24, at 877 (noting that Twombly was cited 4000 times 
the first nine months after it was decided). 
 78. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 79. H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 80. See Frankel, supra note 77.  These witnesses included Arthur Miller of the New York 
University School of Law, John Vail of the Center for Constitutional Law, and Debo Adegbile of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. 
 81. See id. (quoting John Vail of the Center for Constitutional Law). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Perceived and Actual Ramifications of Twombly and Iqbal 
Iqbal’s application of Twombly’s plausibility standard in a civil 
rights context, indeed, in all civil actions, has caused concern among 
many.82  The importance of defeating a defendant’s motion to dismiss is 
obvious—accessing justice and having one’s rights vindicated—yet, 
these cases have raised the stakes at this early stage in litigation.  One 
main criticism of the Iqbal standard is that it is not consistent with the 
liberal principles behind notice pleading.83  The new standard arguably 
prohibits plaintiffs from bringing actions based on facts they could not 
reasonably be expected to ascertain.84  By rejecting Conley’s “no set of 
facts” standard, Twombly and Iqbal effectively made a trade-off—justice 
for efficiency.  Even if Iqbal was correctly decided on the facts, there is a 
danger in sustaining motions to dismiss under a plausibility standard 
when plaintiffs’ allegations stem from organizational mistreatment and 
the accused are too far-removed to garner the requisite factual 
enhancement.  Iqbal has affected cases in federal court and is likely to 
impact cases filed in state courts as well because rules of procedure at the 
state level are typically patterned on the Federal Rules.85 
Scholars have criticized the standard for its lack of clarity and 
precision, leaving the judiciary and litigants without a plain 
understanding of its meaning.86  Some courts interpret current pleading 
doctrine as plainly mandating heightened pleadings, while others note a 
tension between the latter and notice pleading, and still others continue to 
endorse the traditional liberal standard.87  The plausibility standard’s goal 
of preventing unworthy discovery and case-management costs, as stated 
in Twombly, is misplaced when the standard is so unclear as to keep 
                                                     
 82. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 3 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 09-41 Sept. 3, 2009) (noting that after 
Iqbal, many critics now believe that it is imperative to understand the effects of plausibility 
pleading); Peter Vieth, Federal Pleading Standard Promotes Removal, VA. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 31, 
2009 (quoting a lawyer deeming Iqbal “troubling”). 
 83. See Spencer, supra note 6, at 431–32. 
 84. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (concerning plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, who 
could not have possibly had information about the impropriety of Attorney General Ashcroft and 
other high-level government officials). 
 85. Lonny Hoffman, Using Presuit Discovery to Overcome Barriers to the Courthouse, 34 
LITIG. 31, 32 (2008). 
 86. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 2, at 1. 
 87. See id. at 7–8 (discussing the varied interpretations of courts applying the Twombly 
standard). 
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litigants in a state of speculation.  Additionally, Iqbal has been criticized 
for extending the defeat of suits that are actually meritless, like Twombly, 
to suits that are merely weak.88 
One procedural implication of Twombly’s application to all civil 
actions stems from the difference between state and federal pleading 
standards.89  Where possible, defendants may be more likely to seek 
removal in favor of the higher standard placed on complaints in federal 
court. 
1. Inability of “Far-Removed” Plaintiffs to Substantiate Factual Matters 
As a preliminary matter, Iqbal has had an effect on claimants 
bringing lawsuits of every nature.  In particular, the ability of litigants 
like Javaid Iqbal to successfully allege impropriety is difficult because of 
their inability to access crucial factual material absent some kind of 
discovery.  In the face of the higher standard, the pleas of these claimants 
will be dead on arrival.  Essentially, Iqbal can be viewed as denying 
potentially valid claims that do not yet have the requisite facts.  The 
Court’s reluctance to endorse “phased” discovery in Twombly90 
illustrates the uphill battle that claimants face.  In the antitrust context, 
the Court made clear that only through ensuring that a complaint’s 
allegations reach a suggestive level will enormous discovery expenses be 
avoided.91 
Thus, surviving a motion to dismiss can prove impossible for 
plaintiffs who face the need to allege specific evil motives or 
wrongdoings of high-level officials.92  Even though civil rights and other 
similar claims are often in the context of large organizations—
governmental, industrial, or otherwise—that involve complex claims 
against multiple defendants, they are still required to plead sufficient 
factual material to suggest their claim.  These cases also have a tendency 
                                                     
 88. See generally Bone, supra note 82 (discussing implications of screening weak lawsuits 
versus meritless ones). 
 89. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 512 (noting that the Federal Rules have a 
“strong impact” on most states’ civil procedure rules but that some “still vary greatly”). 
 90. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559–60 n.6 (2007) (elaborating on the 
majority’s perceived limitations of “phased” discovery). 
 91. See id. at 559 (“[I]t is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level of 
suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of 
discovery . . . .”). 
 92. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 535, 561 (2009) (noting that Twombly will deny court access to people that have meritorious 
claims “either because they lack the resources to engage in extensive prefiling investigation or 
because of informational asymmetries”). 
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to reflect larger policy matters that courts may be reluctant to accept or 
manage in the first place. 
2. Incentivized Removal to Federal Court 
Another implication of Iqbal is the increased attractiveness of a 
federal forum to defendants because of the higher pleading standard.  
State courts are divided in their endorsement of the Twombly pleading 
standard.  Prior to Twombly, twenty-six states and the District of 
Columbia modeled their dismissal standards on Conley.93  South Dakota 
is one state that seemingly abandoned its notice-based pleading regime in 
favor of Twombly’s standard in Sisney v. Best.94  That court’s reasoning 
was essentially that because South Dakota’s statute mirrored the Federal 
Rules by requiring a “‘showing’ that the pleader is ‘entitled’ to relief,” it 
seemed appropriate to embrace Twombly.95  Yet, two months later, the 
same court awkwardly clarified that in spite of their adoption of 
Twombly and overruling of prior cases relying on Conley, South Dakota 
still embraced notice pleading.96 
Other states that have confronted the standard have eschewed it in 
favor of their existing notice pleading regime.  For example, Arizona 
firmly stated that in spite of Twombly it remains loyal to its interpretation 
of its own statute, which mirrors Federal Rule 8(a), but has been 
interpreted differently than both Conley and Twombly.97  Vermont also 
faced an argument for the application of the heightened standard: 
because the state had adopted its standard based on Conley, it should 
now follow Twombly.98  The Vermont Supreme Court dismissed the 
argument and reiterated its judicial independence stating, “[W]e . . . are 
in no way bound by federal jurisprudence in interpreting our state 
pleading rules.”99 
In spite of these disinclinations, states, like the aforementioned, that 
did not alter their standards post-Twombly to align with the Twombly 
standard may be more likely to do so after Iqbal.  This is because Iqbal 
clearly rejects the notion that the plausibility standard is limited to 
antitrust cases and provides more procedural clarity and uniformity.  
                                                     
 93. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dodson, supra note 12, at 141. 
 94. Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 808–09 (S.D. 2008). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Gruhlke v. Sioux Empire Fed. Credit Union, 756 N.W.2d 399, 409 (S.D. 2008). 
 97. Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 346–48 (Ariz. 2008). 
 98. Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008). 
 99. Id. 
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State courts may find the uniform application to all civil cases an 
attractive policy for judicial economy reasons.  Conversely, states, like 
Arizona and Vermont, may maintain that their pleading regime is 
superior and demonstrate reluctance to federal influence.  Various federal 
courts also differ in their treatment of applying the standard to 
affirmative defenses, which will be examined. 
Insofar as state courts retain a more liberal notion of pleading that 
rests on Conley’s “no set of facts” standard or something similar, federal 
courts will be the likely choice of forum for defendants.  One 
commentator has suggested that such preferences will likely come to 
fruition, and even detailed a specific instance of one such partiality.100  
Scholars have called forum selection “the name of the game” for lawyers 
and removal can be a key phase in executing that selection.101  Although, 
there will be limitations to removal, markedly the ability to establish that 
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and that the parties are 
diverse or that there is a federal question disputed.102  Interestingly, if the 
pleading dichotomy between state and federal courts actually creates this 
preference, it is likely that one of Twombly’s stated purposes—to reduce 
litigation costs—will be refuted.  Incentivizing removal will only result 
in more transactional costs to the litigant by way of more billable hours 
spent on pleading and peripheral costs like travel to the federal venue. 
3. Applying “Plausibility” to Affirmative Defenses 
The focus on pleading after Twombly and Iqbal centered on the 
complaint because both cases adjudicated a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but 
courts have since addressed another implication of those decisions—
what standard to apply to defenses pled.  While a minority of courts have 
not applied the heightened Twombly-Iqbal standard to affirmative 
defenses, the majority view endorses applying the standard to these 
pleadings.103  This is necessary because, as one court noted, “otherwise a 
court could not make a Rule 12(f) determination on whether an 
affirmative defense is adequately pleaded under Rules 8 and/or 9 and  
 
                                                     
 100. Vieth, supra note 82 (alluding to a Virginia court’s ruling in Branham v. Dolgencorp Inc.). 
 101. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1921–
22 (2009). 
 102. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332 (2006). 
 103. Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., No. 09-2202-JWL-GLR, 2009 WL 5171779, at *2 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 22, 2009). 
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could not determine whether the affirmative defense would withstand a 
Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.”104 
The minority view is based on the rationale that because Twombly 
was interpreting Rule 8(a) and not Rule 8(b), relating to defenses 
generally, or Rule 8(c), relating to affirmative defenses, the heightened 
standard should not apply to them.105  The majority approach is more 
logical considering the balance needed between pleading parties.  To 
apply the standard to one party and not the other ignores the purpose of 
both pleadings—to provide notice to the other party that some plausible 
basis for the assertion exists.  Similar to Rule 8(a)(2), Rule 8(b)(1)(A) 
requires the litigant to “state in short and plain terms [the party’s] 
defenses to each claim asserted against it.”106  This similarity, coupled 
with the general application of Rule 8(b) to defenses, indicates that 
affirmative defenses should be judged by the same standard. 
4. Disadvantages of Current Doctrine and the Need for Pleading 
Reform 
The primary disadvantages of current pleading doctrine are the 
inconsistency with which it is applied, its general lack of clarity, and its 
divergence from traditional liberal notice pleading.  The inconsistency 
leaves litigants guessing how the judiciary will construe “plausibility” as 
to the allegations of their complaint.  This causes an “unpredictability 
that will underdeter frivolous claims and overencourage motions to 
dismiss.”107  The traditional principle that courts are to accept all factual 
allegations as true has been tainted by Twombly and Iqbal, which have 
caused courts to be more skeptical in their determination of whether facts 
are plausible.108 
When a judge exercises her discretion in construing “plausibility,” 
she provides a more comprehensible view of her notion of that term as 
applied to certain facts.  In doing so, it may lead to increased forum 
shopping by defendants.  Such a preference may be particularly likely 
because of the complex and high stakes nature of the cases in which the 
                                                     
 104. United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 
6, 2007). 
 105. See generally First Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Camps Servs., Ltd., No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 WL 22861 
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009); Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469 
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009). 
 106. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A). 
 107. Spencer, supra note 2, at 1. 
 108. Id. at 8–9. 
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current pleading standard is likely to be contested, like class actions.  
Defendants may be allowed considerable choice of venue in those 
circumstances.  Again, such a practice results in increased litigation costs 
by way of research, pleadings, and travel, counter to the emphasis on 
judicial economy in Twombly.109 
Pleading doctrine, like many legal doctrines, has always suffered 
from lack of clarity on some level.  Inherent in legal argument is 
construing words to be most favorable to one’s client.  However, current 
plausibility doctrine adds something to the traditional lack of clarity that 
was centered on Conley’s language and the word “showing” in Rule 
8(a)(2); the addition of “conceivable to plausible” and related phrases 
leaves litigants wondering where exactly their claims fall.110 
Another disadvantage is the extent to which it conflicts with the 
traditional doctrine of notice pleading.  Twombly’s emphasis on 
providing factual allegations showing the claimant is entitled to relief has 
been criticized as being counter to the understanding of the drafters of 
the Federal Rules.111  There has even been speculation that the standard 
is at odds with Form 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.112  Form 
11 does not require plaintiffs to plead facts that establish a defendant’s 
negligence.  Professor A. Benjamin Spencer, a respected scholar on the 
current state of pleading, uses the fundamental example of a negligence 
claim arising from a car wreck.  Facts pled surrounding the defendant’s 
negligence—such as use of a cell phone while driving or speeding—are 
not necessary to state a claim.  This is because the surrounding fact of a 
collision creates a presumption of impropriety that gives the plaintiff the 
right to proceed to discovery where he has a good chance of 
substantiating his allegation of impropriety.113  He further reasons that 
Form 11 does not require plaintiffs to allege such facts as cell phone use 
or speeding because they “may not be able to know [these facts] prior to 
discovery.”114  However, under the current standard, if the plaintiff was  
 
                                                     
 109. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
 110. Spencer, supra note 2, at 11; see also Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 178 (2007) (Cabranes, 
J., concurring) (noting that Bell Atlantic and relevant Second Circuit precedents are “less than crystal 
clear and fully deserve reconsideration by the Supreme Court at the earliest opportunity; to say the 
least, ‘the guidance they provide is not readily harmonized’”), rev’d sub nom., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 111. Spencer, supra note 6, at 442. 
 112. Spencer, supra note 2, at 13; see also Doe ex. rel. Gonzales v. Butte Valley Unified Sch. 
Dist., No. Civ. 09-245, 2009 WL 2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009) (noting that “even the 
official Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Forms . . . have been cast into doubt by Iqbal”). 
 113. Spencer, supra note 2, at 27–28. 
 114. Id. 
0.6.0_MIZE FINAL 5/31/2010  2:18:09 PM 
2010] FROM PLAUSIBILITY TO CLARITY 1263 
hit from behind and had no information about the tortfeasor’s 
contribution to the accident, his claim would fail.115 
A clearer standard would provide more reliability for litigants 
pursuing their cases.  They will not find themselves speculating about 
what a particular judge’s idea of “plausibility” is and will have a better 
idea of the merits of their claim.  Cases perceived to have a weak merits 
basis would not be excluded based on their lack of factual pleading.  To 
be sure, a reversion to Conley may be unwarranted, but something 
clearer than the current standard is warranted. 
B.  Judicial Remedies 
Having established the problems with the current pleading doctrine, 
the issue then becomes a suitable and effective remedy.  A few exist in 
the judicial arena, but would require judicial activism that judges are 
unlikely to exercise short of a more unambiguous standard from the 
Supreme Court.  However, the next section will further illustrate the 
types of issues that formal rulemaking—amending the Federal Rules or 
enacting claim-specific laws116—can help clarify. 
1.  Discretion in Defining “Plausibility” 
The language of the plausibility standard provides courts discretion 
in determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief by 
noting that it will require courts to engage in a “context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense.”117  Similarly, Justice Souter’s dissent in Iqbal reiterated 
his statement in Twombly that “a court must take the allegations as true, 
no matter how skeptical the court may be,” adding his exception for 
sufficiently fantastic allegations concerning little green men or time 
travel experiences.118  Such a statement illustrates the level of scrutiny 
the author of Twombly envisioned applying to factual allegations in a 
complaint—one that the Iqbal majority refuted and heightened.  As 
evident from the majority and dissent in Iqbal, judges have differing 
notions of plausibility.  Other factors also play into a court’s plausibility 
determination, like the errors alleged by the Iqbal dissent, namely, that 
                                                     
 115. Id. 
 116. See discussion infra Parts III.C–D. 
 117. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
 118. Id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the majority isolated contested allegations and failed to read them in 
conjunction with other paragraphs of the complaint.119 
Lower courts’ decisions after Twombly and Iqbal also serve as 
evidence of such variation.120  The term itself gives courts significant 
flexibility in determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief and is a 
significant reason for the lack of clarity under current doctrine.  One 
scholar captures the need for courts to provide a clearer definition: 
Concepts such as “more than labels and conclusions,” “above the 
speculative level,” “plausible grounds to infer,” “enough factual 
material to suggest,” “reasonable expectation,” and “enough heft” are 
instructive in that they tell litigants that more than a possibility but less 
than a probability must be shown.  Beyond that, however, there is 
uncertainty regarding precisely what level of factual detail will make a 
statement of a claim plausible and nonspeculative.  Indeed, courts may 
disagree regarding the plausibility of a claim unless that term is given 
more objective definition.121 
The likelihood of courts uniting behind a clearer standard is not great 
considering the discretion that the plausibility standard allows.122  The 
surge in applying the plausibility standard, even to cases outside of a 
“complex” context after Twombly,123 suggests that some courts endorse 
such a standard, but nevertheless, still face the standard’s lack of 
precision.  Following Iqbal, one federal district court interpreted the 
Court’s plausibility standard as a “highly contextual enterprise—
dependent on the particular claims asserted, their elements, and the 
overall factual picture alleged in the complaint.”124  While the obligation 
to follow precedent may seemingly tip the scale toward a clearer 
standard, the previous quote illustrates the latitude given judges in 
defining plausibility.  The usual application of the standard would still be 
in favor of heightened pleading to the detriment of plaintiffs, especially 
in certain contexts.  Because of the direction civil litigation is headed and 
the binding precedents of Twombly and Iqbal, it is unlikely that such  
 
                                                     
 119. Id. at 1960–61. 
 120. See Spencer, supra note 2, at 7–8. 
 121. Id. at 11. 
 122. See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the 
Plausibility Standard after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
505, 518 (2009) (noting that “the actual meaning of the plausibility standard . . . remains as 
important and as unclear as ever”). 
 123. See Spencer, supra note 6, at 458 (noting the application of Twombly to all cases by lower 
federal courts). 
 124. Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009). 
0.6.0_MIZE FINAL 5/31/2010  2:18:09 PM 
2010] FROM PLAUSIBILITY TO CLARITY 1265 
judicial discretion would remedy the more fundamental problem of the 
standard’s application to all civil actions. 
2. Allowance of Minimally Intrusive “Phased” Discovery 
Modern complex litigation and the exorbitant discovery costs it can 
impose have been serious judicial considerations in defining heightened 
pleading standards for certain claims.  In Twombly itself, the court 
expressed concern that “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-
consuming”125 discovery would “push cost-conscious defendants to settle 
even anemic cases.”126  The Court cited one study showing that discovery 
can account for up to ninety percent of litigation costs if actively 
employed.127  However, several commentators have challenged the 
Court’s emphasis on discovery costs as a justification for imposing a 
higher standard.128 
Modifying pleading standards has an unavoidable effect on 
discovery and other pretrial procedures.129  Because notice pleading rests 
on the idea that further investigation will flesh out the facts behind the 
claim, the broad means of discovery should obviate the need for parties 
to state facts in detail at the pleading stage.130  With notice pleading 
eschewed in favor of a higher standard, it would seem appropriate that 
discovery be altered in some way as well.  However, as detailed in Part 
II.B, the Iqbal Court rejected the Second Circuit’s views on one possible 
remedy—“phased” discovery—noting that “‘the success of judicial 
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest 
side.’”131  The Court also gave substantial weight to the fact that the 
defendants had qualified immunity as government officials and was 
reluctant to burden the execution of their duties with discovery.132 
In a sense, Iqbal’s reliance on Twombly’s discovery reasoning is 
warranted because both cases involved the extreme ends of 
                                                     
 125. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 n.6 (2007). 
 126. Id. at 559. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 35, at 1769 (noting that plaintiffs sometimes set forth more 
detailed pleadings, even if not required to do so, depending on their evaluation of certain factors, one 
of which is the potential cost of discovery); Spencer, supra note 2, at 35–36 (arguing that the cost of 
discovery does not affect whether plaintiffs satisfy the plausibility threshold in their pleadings). 
 129. Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and 
Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1453 (2008). 
 130. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra  note 20, at 513. 
 131. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 559 (2007)). 
 132. Id. 
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organizational hierarchy and multiple defendants that could produce 
sprawling and exorbitant discovery costs.  Yet, Iqbal’s application to all 
civil actions decreases the relevance of a pervasive rejection of “phased 
discovery.”  Many instances of actionable discrimination, for example, 
occur in the context of mid-sized corporations, educational institutions, 
government agencies, or other organizations for which discovery would 
pose no such burden.  Justifying heightened pleading based on costly 
discovery or burden alone is not a sufficient reason to deny plaintiffs 
access to courts. 
Federal Rule 27, as stated and interpreted by courts, recognizes a 
narrow allowance for presuit discovery.  Iqbal’s rejection of a careful 
case management approach seemed to be specific to the Second Circuit’s 
instructions to the district court and did not necessarily implicate this 
rule.133  The pertinent part of the rule states that “to perpetuate testimony 
about any matter cognizable in a United States court,” an oral or written 
deposition may be taken to “prevent a failure or delay of justice.”134  
However, courts almost uniformly construe Rule 27 as applicable in 
three contexts: (1) to preserve witness testimony when there is a credible 
risk that the testimony may be lost if not recorded immediately; (2) to 
confirm the proper party to name as a defendant or to gather additional 
information necessary to institute legal proceedings; and (3) to 
investigate presuit claims.135  The best opportunity for presuit discovery 
to combat heightened pleading standards falls in the last context.  
However, few courts have allowed plaintiffs under Rule 27 to investigate 
potential claims or confirm the proper defendant to sue.136  Therefore, it 
may be unlikely for a court, without precedent or a more explicit rule, to 
allow litigants to use presuit discovery to substantiate potentially 
meritless allegations. 
Variation in states’ versions of Rule 27 may also contribute to more 
active forum selection.137  For example, New York’s version of the rule 
allows claimants to gather more information necessary for commencing a 
legal proceeding.138  Some other states authorize a much more extensive 
use of presuit discovery.  Texas allows forthcoming plaintiffs to 
perpetuate testimony “for use in anticipated suit” or “to investigate a 
                                                     
 133. See id. 
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1), (3). 
 135. See id. 
 136. Hoffman, supra note 85, at 33. 
 137. See forum-selection discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 138. Hoffman, supra note 85, at 33.  However, most New York courts only allow such use of the 
rule to add to factual claims already known to exist. Id. 
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potential claim or suit.”139  The size of these two states is not without 
significance in analyzing their rules’ effects on forum selection, 
particularly in the products liability and antitrust class action arena.  
More businesses are likely to have their principal place of business there 
and be subjected to suit in those jurisdictions.  Both plaintiffs and 
defendants might be more inclined to seek these venues, insofar as 
plaintiffs believe their claims to be meritorious or defendants believe 
plaintiffs’ claims to be without merit. 
3. Increased Enforcement of Rule 11 to Combat Meritless Claims and 
Discovery Abuses 
Rule 11 is another judicial mechanism that could be employed to 
combat the frivolous and bothersome claims that were a partial reason 
for the Court raising the standard.  Dissenting in Twombly, Justice 
Stevens articulated the relevance to and availability of Rule 11 against 
meritless claims, stating “should it become apparent over the course of 
litigation that a plaintiff’s filings bespeak an in terrorem suit, the district 
court has at its call its own in terrorem device, in the form of a wide 
array of Rule 11 sanctions.”140  The rule makes clear that by an attorney 
“presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an 
attorney certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” 
the presentation is not being made to cause unnecessary delay, is not 
frivolous, and will have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
investigation.141  Rule 11 also provides the court with the ability to 
sanction an attorney if his or her actions are found in violation of 
subsection (b).142 
One drawback of increasing Rule 11’s use against meritless claims in 
the post-Iqbal era is that it would place too much pressure on attorneys to 
conduct a plausibility analysis from the outset.  Given the difficulty and 
inconsistency courts themselves have had with such an analysis, the 
desire for claimants to have their rights vindicated should not hinge on 
attorneys fearing plausibility.  Additionally, an attorney may never have 
the opportunity for “reasonable investigation” when the courts have 
seemingly closed the door on “phased discovery” that allows litigants to 
gain the now-requisite factual assertions. 
                                                     
 139. Id. 
 140. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 595 n.13 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
0.6.0_MIZE FINAL 5/31/2010  2:18:09 PM 
1268 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
Rule 11 was amended in 1993 to combat a perceived “chilling 
effect” that was making lawyers less likely to file meritorious claims in 
court and disproportionately affected plaintiffs’ lawyers and lawyers 
asserting pro bono causes.143  These amendments, among other things, 
granted courts more discretion in imposing sanctions, expressly 
supported non-monetary sanctions, and provided that opposing parties 
must be served with Rule 11 motions twenty-one days prior to filing 
them with the court.144  The intent of these amendments may make courts 
less likely to impose sanctions on plaintiffs to weed out frivolous claims 
rather than applying a heightened standard.  Indeed, Rule 11 sanctions 
have been reduced in recent years and the trend is likely to continue.145 
C.  Amending the Federal Rules 
In rulings prior to Twombly concerning Rule 8(a)(2), the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that certain claims might be subjected to a 
heightened requirement if “Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today,” adding 
that such a ruling would have been attained by the “process of amending 
the Federal Rules.”146  Similarly, in Crawford-El v. Britton, the Court 
responded to the appellate court’s rationale of imposing a heightened 
standard to reduce the access to discovery in actions that require proof of 
motive.147  It noted that issues concerning pleading, discovery, and 
summary judgment are “most frequently and most effectively resolved 
either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process.”148  
Obviously, these acknowledgements are noteworthy, given the Supreme 
Court’s actions in both Twombly and, to a greater extent, Iqbal.  Even in 
Twombly, the Court stated that they were not applying a heightened 
standard and that doing so would require an amendment of the Federal 
Rules, not judicial interpretation.149  The more even split of the Court in 
Iqbal than in Twombly likely reflects the Court’s previously stated 
                                                     
 143. Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On—Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs Beware: Rule 11 
Vis-à-vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 656–57 
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 146. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1993) (declining to apply a heightened standard in a § 1983 claim against a municipality); see 
also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (stating that the Federal Rules do not 
include a “heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits”); Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (discussing previous rejections of heightened pleading standards). 
 147. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 595. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007). 
0.6.0_MIZE FINAL 5/31/2010  2:18:09 PM 
2010] FROM PLAUSIBILITY TO CLARITY 1269 
reluctance to promulgate a ubiquitously heightened standard from the 
bench. 
Because there are both judicial and legislative elements involved in 
amending the Federal Rules,150 this discussion stands apart as a sort of 
hybrid.  To be sure, it is largely influenced by the judicial sector.  
“Judicial,” in this sense, means judges, lawyers, and academics—
individuals who day in and day out observe trends in practice and in 
theory.  The power to amend the Federal Rules is found in the Rules 
Enabling Act, first adopted in 1934, which states, “The Supreme Court 
shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice . . . for cases in 
the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.”151  The 
process of amendment begins with the Judicial Conference’s 
recommendation of a rule change to the Supreme Court.152  This rule is 
considered by the Advisory Committee, composed of judges, lawyers, 
and academics, which either approves or rejects the proposal.153  If 
approved, the proposals are evaluated by the Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure appointed by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court.154  It is then reviewed by the Judicial Conference, which 
forwards it to the Supreme Court, which, upon its approval, sends it to 
Congress, where it will become law unless that body exercises its veto 
power within seven months.155 
The input of judges, lawyers, and legal academics would be of great 
value to any revision of the pleading rules.  To the extent that judges’ 
past attempts at approving a heightened pleading standard for certain 
causes of action were rooted in an effort to screen meritless claims, their 
input is of obvious value in the amendment process.  Judges, as well as 
practitioners, know the practical challenges facing the court as an 
institution in matters of judicial economy and docket control.  Also, 
adequate public involvement is permitted through open hearings, 
invitations, and solicitations of participation.156 
There are three ways, or a combination thereof, in which the Federal 
Rules could be amended to resolve the current pleading issue.  First, 
                                                     
 150. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 407 (citing Robert Bone, The Process of 
Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 
887, 888, 892 (1999)). 
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006). 
 152. Bone, supra note 150, at 892. 
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political pressure). 
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there could be an amendment that uses language to exact a pleading 
requirement in Rule 8 which clarifies or negates the notion of plausibility 
in the current standard.  Second, there could be an amendment to Rule 9 
to capture certain causes of action where plausibility or a similarly 
heightened standard should apply, like antitrust.  Third, Rules 16 (case 
management), 26 (regarding pretrial disclosures), and 27 (regarding 
perpetuating testimony) could be revised and emboldened to allow more 
equitable case screening by the judiciary through management of presuit 
discovery that ferrets out frivolous claims. 
The attractiveness of amending Rule 8 to clarify the current standard 
is that any language accomplishing it would, in tone with current 
language, likely remain brief and facially understandable.  However, 
further examination would likely reveal the same linguistic ambiguities 
that “short and plain” have presented, as well as the vagueness of the 
current plausibility standard.157  Articulation of a more complex standard 
would be contrary to the idea that pleading should be accessible to the 
everyday litigant and a simple matter of notice. 
The second way is to amend Rule 9(b) to encompass the types of 
litigation in need of a heightened standard.  Yet a claim-specific standard 
would conflict with Rule 1, which states that the scope and purpose of 
the Federal Rules is to “govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings.”158  Additionally, the reasons that Rule 9 exists—
“protection of reputation, deterrence of frivolous or strike suits, defense 
of completed transactions, and providing adequate notice”159—do not 
comport with the purpose of providing uniform clarity.  For these 
reasons, those involved in the amendment process may be hesitant to 
endorse more specific causes of action that fall under a heightened 
standard via the Federal Rules.  Doing so would be an unruly task—
certain types of claims will not always embody the kinds of facts 
necessary for heightened pleading under Rule 9’s “fraud or mistake” 
language.  As already noted, a wide range of factual pleading 
requirements already seem to exist for certain types of litigation.160  Rule 
9(b)’s language was meant to encompass common-law fraud claims that 
are quite different from modern fraud claims, like securities fraud.161 
Reducing these causes of action into a Federal Rule would be 
difficult for a couple reasons.  First, the causes of action that may be 
                                                     
 157. See supra Part III.A.4. 
 158. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
 159. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 562–67 (2002). 
 160. See Fairman, supra note 22, at 989. 
 161. Fairman, supra note 159, at 608. 
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subject to the amended rule vary so greatly that it would be impracticable 
to craft a single rule.162  Secondly, many causes of action that might fall 
under the rule, like antitrust, are based on statutes that are subject to 
legislation.  Such legislation could be amended but that would 
necessitate an amendment to the Federal Rules, and an unworkable and 
impractical system.  Additionally, finding language suitable to 
encompass modern statutory fraud claims would suffer from the same 
simplified language problem as Rule 8. 
The third option is to amend case management and discovery rules to 
allow for more equitable screening of cases.  Insofar as courts do not 
construe Rule 27 liberally, it could also be amended to enable litigants to 
more easily pursue limited discovery to deal with a specified set of 
claims where the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to have the 
necessary facts to supplement allegations. 
Several scholars have argued that under the current standard, fairness 
reasons justify allowance for minimally intrusive presuit discovery.163  
The use of minimally intrusive discovery should be allowed in 
circumstances where, in the court’s judgment, the plaintiff could not 
have reasonably been expected to access such facts necessary for the 
requirement.  The judiciary’s judgment would allow courts to ferret out 
what they view as a fishing expedition in favor of more wholesome 
claims.  Generally, this notion is congruent with Federal Rule 16, which 
gives the court broad case management abilities.164  Another proposed 
supplemental policy that would help sort claims before the court is to 
shift the costs, or a fraction of the costs, to the plaintiff.165  Such a policy 
would need to be tempered to find a burden that would not be so heavy 
as to prevent plaintiffs from bringing suits, even if their merits were 
worthy, or so weak as to sustain the frivolity of plaintiffs to bring a 
meritless claim. 
Practically, amending discovery rules may be an easier task than 
pleading rules.  The brevity of the current pleading rules suggests an 
effort to keep things uniform and simple.  This effort is in line with the 
traditional notice theory, but nonetheless quite complicated and more 
controversial.  Conversely, discovery rules are extensive and detailed to 
account for the various discovery methods and to prevent their abuses.  
This provides an avenue for more explicit guidance to the judiciary and 
                                                     
 162. See generally Fairman, supra note 22 (detailing the causes of action to which a heightened 
standard of pleading has been applied). 
 163. See Bone, supra note 24, at 900–06. 
 164. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
 165. See Bone, supra note 24, at 928. 
0.6.0_MIZE FINAL 5/31/2010  2:18:09 PM 
1272 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
practitioners.  While the effect of amending discovery rules means 
imposing a higher adaptive curve on the judiciary and practitioners, both 
have made such adjustments before. 
Additionally, the use of presuit discovery is beneficial to both 
parties.  If implemented, the role of the judge in defining “plausibility” is 
circumvented, providing for more effective screening and adequate 
assessment of seemingly nonmeritorious claims.  In multi-defendant 
litigation, such discovery can provide an economical benefit by 
preventing some parties from having meritless claims brought against 
them and narrowing the field of defendants. 
Generally, this rulemaking process would shield the proposal from 
interest-group influence and devious political pressures to a greater 
extent than congressional legislation.166  It is also likely to be a less 
politically charged issue because it addresses the Twombly-Iqbal 
paradigm more discreetly.  Rather than amending the rules causing 
controversy in those cases, it changes rules that promise benefit for both 
parties in litigation.  Amending discovery and case management practice 
under the Federal Rules is the best of the three options considered.  
Absent such amendments, the next best alternative is claim-specific 
legislation. 
D.  Legislative Remedies 
As mentioned in Part II.B, Twombly and Iqbal concerned complex 
claims and legal issues, but managed to raise the pleading standard for all 
civil actions.  This judicial process has had the effect of what one scholar 
likens to a “Cadillac process . . . [that] helps to drive out of federal court 
those who can afford only a Ford.”167  Decisions concerning such policy-
related issues, like access to courts, are properly left to the formal 
rulemaking bodies like the legislature or those involved in the rule 
amendment process.  These processes ensure adequate input and 
contribution from the legal community.  A statute that clears the 
confusion about the pleading standard may be preferable for several 
reasons.  Principally, the law would be democratic in its representation of 
the will of the people and would draw on testimony from the judiciary 
and legal scholars to create a less confusing and more viable standard.  
The legislative process would ensure that all parties were heard, 
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accounting for and accurately reflecting societal and judicial needs.168  In 
accommodating public input on these matters, the public would have 
increased confidence in the judiciary, which is increasingly viewed as a 
product “not only of the political process, but of ordinary politics.”169 
A few legislative options exist to improve the current standard.  First, 
Congress could enact legislation that substantiates a claim-specific 
standard for an area or a related range of areas.  These standards could be 
more stringent, like Rule 9, or be in the mold of PSLRA’s pleading 
standard.170  Second, Congress could, as it is currently contemplating, 
enact legislation that returns to the pre-Twombly and Iqbal standard, by 
making clear the threshold by which 12(b)(6) motions will be granted or 
the standard by which claims will be allowed under Rule 8. 
To some extent, Iqbal affirmed the direction that lower federal courts 
were already headed in after Twombly.171  Many pre-Iqbal opinions read 
Twombly as being generally applicable to all federal cases.172  For 
example, cases involving religious discrimination,173 Federal Housing 
Administration violation,174 and employment discrimination175 all applied 
Twombly’s standard prior to Iqbal.  This suggests some courts may have 
viewed the application of a newer, heightened standard as overdue and 
necessary for judicial efficiency.  Such partiality signals a judicial 
perception that something needs to be done to combat frivolous claims 
that burden not only the court but other litigants.  Because the cases that 
typically impose such burdens involve more complex claims, a specific 
legislative standard for them may be a viable alternative. 
1. Legislation Prescribing Claim-Specific Standards 
As noted in Part II, supra, resistance to notice pleading in various 
areas of the law existed prior to Twombly’s overruling of Conley and 
Iqbal’s extension to all civil actions.176  This resistance was present in the 
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years following the implementation of the pleading system, but, after 
Conley, notice pleading ended the speculation about whether the liberal 
rules were genuine in application.177  At times, courts challenged its 
application in various contexts; at other times, legislative action would 
alter pleading standards for specific types of claims.  The latter was the 
case with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) passed 
by Congress in 1995, over presidential veto, to combat frivolous lawsuits 
in the private securities arena.178  Since its inception, PSLRA has 
received its share of criticism.179  These negative reviews largely center 
around deciphering the heightened scienter requirement and confusing 
legislative history.180  Such criticisms could be particular to the securities 
fraud context and should not deter future pleading legislation. 
The enactment of PSLRA came after industry groups complained of 
frivolous “sue now, discover later” suits, comparable to the one in 
Twombly, that classes of plaintiff investors were entitled to file.181  
Congress required that plaintiffs plead misleading statement and 
omission claims with particularity as well as conforming with the 
scienter requirement.182  Discovery is also not allowed while a motion to 
dismiss is pending.183  The application of PSLRA has received criticism 
similar to Iqbal in that it requires a plaintiff to plead facts only the 
defendant possesses, without the benefit of some kind of discovery.184  
These mishaps of the PSLRA and its application should serve as lessons 
for lawmakers. 
Legislative reform is preferable to judicial analysis from the bench.  
As already noted, reliance on binding judicial interpretation and 
precedence is not an efficient and resourceful way to go about changing 
the standard when it implicates greater policy and social concerns.  
Iqbal’s civil rights action is a primary illustration of one such concern.  
Cases that have the effect of adjudicative policymaking lack the educated 
and needed input of lower court judges, practitioners, academics, and the 
public, making it generally undemocratic. 
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2. Returning to Conley: Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 
The Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 or, alternatively, the 
Access to Open Courts Act of 2009, proposes to retract the current 
judicial interpretation of Rule 8(a) and essentially restore the application 
of Conley to 12(b)(6) motions.  The success of that bill’s current 
language is unlikely because of the simplicity of the standard.  Reverting 
back to Conley for all civil actions would reflect a poor assessment of the 
modern demands of litigation.  As illustrated by Twombly, allowing 
plaintiffs to impose exorbitant discovery costs on defendants by way of a 
claim that does not withstand judicial plausibility is unjust.  Another 
perceived hurdle to such legislation is the political clout among interest 
groups favoring the standard that may be exerted to influence legislators.  
The perception of “anemic” claims withstanding judicial scrutiny will 
bolster the opposition of economically powerful organizations like 
corporations.  Of course, groups advocating liberal notice pleading—the 
plaintiff’s bar and civil rights organizations like the NAACP—will also 
be heard.  Such participation is appropriate because of the political 
stakes.  These competing interests signify one benefit of the proposed 
legislation in that it makes this core democratic issue more publicized 
and provides more opportunity for public input, generating a more 
productive discussion. 
However, any compromise that reflects the needs of modern 
litigation is unlikely under the Bill’s current language that promotes “the 
standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley 
v. Gibson.”185  It is not likely that the simplicity of the language will 
generate the extended discussion necessary to account for current 
complex litigation needs of the type encountered in Twombly. 
Some commentators have already weighed in on the legislation.  One 
proposes a redraft of the bill to include much of the language that refutes 
the language used in Twombly and Iqbal: 
[A] Federal court shall not deem a pleading inadequate under rule 
8(a)(2) or rule 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on 
the ground that such pleading is conclusory or implausible, except that 
a court may take judicial notice of the implausibility of a factual 
allegation.  So long as the pleaded claim or defense provides fair notice 
of the nature of the claim or defense, and the allegations, if taken to be  
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true, would support a legally sufficient claim or defense, a pleading 
satisfies the requirements of rule 8.186 
This proposed standard is more defendant-friendly because it addresses 
complaints under Rule 8, in addition to 12(b)(6) motions.  The proposal 
also attempts to rebut the plausibility standard.  Yet, it still employs 
much of the same language as the current standard and allows for a court 
to take “notice of the implausibility of a factual allegation.”187  Retaining 
this language will not remedy the standard’s current inconsistency and 
lack of clarity. 
If the Bill were to pass in its current form, it is very possible claim-
specific legislation may follow.  The same benefit may have accrued had 
Twombly been decided the other way.  Those defendants most likely 
affected, like corporations, would respond by advocating a heightened 
standard.  A surer path to accommodating fair and efficient pleading 
would be to confront the problem with claim-specific legislation from the 
outset. 
E.  Recommendation 
The two best remedies for the current state of pleading doctrine are 
the amendment of the Federal Rules to provide for equitable case 
screening or Congress’s enactment of claim-specific legislation.  An 
amendment allowing minimally intrusive discovery and reinforcing 
equitable case management to decrease dismissal of meritorious claims is 
the most feasible and practical alteration of the Federal Rules.  The best 
way to go about this is to insert language into the Federal Rules that 
articulates greater judicial discretion in certain circumstances to allow for 
limited discovery in limited circumstances.  Ideally, such a measure 
would affect the type of action brought by far removed plaintiffs like 
Javaid Iqbal.  More language using equitable terms like “undue 
prejudice” or “in the interests of justice” is one step toward granting the 
needed discretion. 
The ability of the amendment process to provide public input is 
highly valued because analyzing a proposed standard involves a 
thorough empirical and theoretical survey of the current judicial 
landscape.  It could involve heavy costs-benefits scrutiny common to 
public policy analysis.  Since part of the judicial justification for 
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heightened pleading is economic (assessing economics of pleading 
practice and cost-shifting analyses), a comprehensive survey of cases and 
litigation costs will need to be considered.  Academics and institutional 
scholars are the most ideal lot for such an empirical task.  The ability of a 
wronged person to “have their day in court” is a serious matter that goes 
to the heart of our democracy. 
Legislation that assigns heightened standards to those causes of 
action Congress deems ripe for such a standard is the best of the purely 
legislative alternatives.  The fact that both Twombly and Iqbal were cases 
involving highly complex claims in complex organizational contexts is 
significant because it is precisely these areas where claim-specific 
legislation would have the greatest effect.  However, such legislation still 
poses the question of what to do with other cases still subjected to the 
plausibility standard.  Absent a clarification of this issue or a 
circumvention of it, like more equitable case management, legislation is 
simply not enough.  The process of amending the Federal Rules ensures 
more logical language and ease in application.  Additionally, legislative 
reform may be unlikely to attract adequate public attention, especially 
among matters such as healthcare and Afghanistan, and may not generate 
a meaningful legislative process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The current state of pleading doctrine places some plaintiffs—
particularly far-removed plaintiffs—in an unjust place that is contrary to 
democratic principles.  While the advantages of economic and judicial 
efficiency have seemingly been at the forefront of modern pleading 
reform, such priorities are at odds with the declared purpose of pleading 
under the Federal Rules.  No doubt these concerns are worthy, but at 
what cost?  Are the complexities of society and desire for judicial 
economy enough to justify modern pleading doctrine?  For the sake of 
those suffering the improprieties of others, often the powerful, such 
justifications are improper.  The best solution to the plausibility problem 
would be amending the Federal Rules to allow for more efficient case 
management early in the lawsuit and limited discovery to test good-faith 
conclusory allegations.  This path avoids the ambiguous language 
problems of the plausibility standard and, politically, is likely to have 
more success than other amendment alternatives.  Alternatively, claim-
specific legislation that imposes heightened standards for those causes of 
action most associated with economic and judicial inefficiency is a viable 
remedy for the application of the current standard. 
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In the wake of Twombly, Iqbal made it harder for not only far-
removed individuals suffering from information asymmetry, but also 
those closely engaged with their adversaries, to bring a complaint that 
would survive the pleading stage.188  The extension of plausibility 
pleading is too strict and at odds with the traditional notion of notice 
pleading.  Further, litigants suffer from a lack of clarity in this evolving 
pleading standard.  Such imprecision can create higher transactional 
costs and burdens for both parties—a result at odds with the notions of 
judicial and economic efficiency that were behind Twombly.  Iqbal’s 
reach to all civil actions could have other procedurally inefficient 
implications, like defendants seeking a federal venue or a particular state 
venue to avail themselves of a favorable application of the current 
standard.  The ability of the judiciary to provide a clearer definition than 
plausibility and allow for minimally intrusive discovery under current 
law is limited. 
Absent formal rulemaking, action by the judiciary will be inefficient.  
Thus, legislative action is the preferred method of remedying the 
negative effects of Twombly and Iqbal.  Pleading standards are a question 
of policy that is best left to the formal rulemaking process promulgated 
under the Rules Enabling Act or through legislation.  Access to courts is 
too important in our democracy not to conform to the democratic will. 
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